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This paper considers effects of price regulation in retail payment systems by 
applying the model of telecommunications competition by Laffont-Rey-Tirole 
(1998). In our two-country model world there is one retail payment network 
located in each country and markets are segmented à la Hotelling. We show that 
the optimal price under price regulation is the weighted average of pre-regulation 
domestic and cross-border prices where the degree of home-bias in making 
payments serves as the weight. Furthermore, we find that the general welfare 
effects of price regulation are ambiguous: gross social welfare is higher under 
price discrimination than under price regulation in the special case where costs of 
access to banking services (transportation costs) are high. However, there also 
exist cases where prohibitively high transaction costs make price discrimination to 
reduce total welfare. Finally, if transportation costs are reduced sufficiently, 
segmentation of payment markets is eliminated. Markets then become fully-
served as in the original Laffont-Rey-Tirole model, suggesting that price 
discrimination would be beneficial for welfare. 
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Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
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Tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan hintasääntelyn vaikutuksia vähittäismaksu-
järjestelmissä soveltamalla Laffont  –  Rey – Tirolen  (1998)  telekommunikaatio-
alan kilpailumallia maksujärjestelmiin. Tarkastelussa käytetään kahden maan 
mallia, jossa kummassakin maassa toimii yksi vähittäismaksujärjestelmä ja 
markkinat ovat jakautuneet Hotellingin mallin mukaan. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, 
että hintasääntelyn tilanteessa optimaalinen hinta on sääntelyä edeltävistä koti- ja 
ulkomaan maksujen hinnoista laskettu painotettu keskiarvo, jossa painona käyte-
tään ns. kotimarkkinaharhaa. Hintasääntelyn hyvinvointivaikutukset ovat mallissa 
epäselvät: hyvinvointi on suurempi hintadiskriminaation tilanteessa verrattuna 
sääntelytilanteeseen, kun pankkipalveluihin pääsyn kustannukset ovat suuret. Jos 
nämä kustannukset otetaan eksplisiittisesti huomioon, kokonaishyvinvointi on 
pienempi hintadiskriminaation vallitessa. Kuitenkin, jos pankkipalveluihin pääsyn 
kustannuksia alennetaan huomattavasti, maksupalvelumarkkinoiden segmentaatio 
katoaa ja markkinat tulevat täysin katetuiksi kuten alkuperäisessä Laffont – Rey –
 Tirolen mallissa. Tällöin hintadiskriminaation salliminen parantaisi hyvinvointia. 
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Payment system issues have received an increasing attention as an integral part of 
the integration process in the European financial markets. The final goal in the 
payments area is to achieve a Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), where there 
should be no difference between domestic and cross-border euro payments. 
Concerning large-value value payments, much progress has been achieved, and 
today the central bank owned TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time 
Gross settlement Express Transfer system) and the privately owned Euro Banking 
Association’s Euro 1 – payment systems are the main large-value payment 
systems offering their services in the EU-wide scale. In contrast, the development 
in the cross-border retail payment system area has been slower, and the fact that 
the prices of cross-border retail payments have remained higher than comparable 
domestic retail payments has provoked much discussion in recent years. In the 
advent of introduction of euro notes and coins, the authorities decided to resort to 
a strong regulatory measure to correct the situation as well as to foster the 
development in the cross-border retail payments area. As a concrete measure, the 
European Parliament and the EU Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 
2560/2001 on Cross-border Payments in Euro in December 2001. The Regulation 
obliges banks to charge equal prices for domestic and cross-border retail 
payments, and it has applied to card payments and ATM (Automated Teller 
Machine) withdrawals as from 1 July 2002 and to cross-border credit transfers as 
from 1 July 2003. 
  Concerning the regulated payments, the wording in the Article 3 of the 
Regulation is the following: 
 
1.  With effect from 1 July 2002 at the latest, charges levied by an institution in 
respect of cross-border electronic payment transactions in euro up to EUR 12 
500 shall be the same as charges levied by the same institution in respect of 
corresponding payments in euro transacted within Member State in which the 
establishment of that institution executing the cross-border electronic 
payment transaction is located. 
 
2.  With effect from 1 July 2003 at the latest, charges levied by an institution in 
respect of cross-border credit transfers in euro up to EUR 12 500 shall be the 
same as charges levied by the same institution in respect of corresponding 
credit transfers in euro transacted within Member State in which the 
establishment of that institution executing the cross-border transfer is located. 
 
In a nutshell, the implementation of the Regulation has meant that the price 
discrimination between comparable domestic and cross-border euro retail  
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payments has been banned and the payment service providers have been forced to 
change their previous pricing policies. 
  On the one hand, the Regulation can be seen as a strong regulatory measure to 
foster the integration process in financial markets by ‘forcing’ the Single Market -
concept also in the retail payment systems area. On the other hand, the Regulation 
and its effects also offer an interesting research question that can be approached 
theoretically by applying models of competition used in other network industries. 
This is justifiable on the grounds that payment industry has many characteristics 
in common with network industries, like telecommunications. Accordingly, the 
general framework of our study is related to the literature on competition in 
telecommunications: eg Armstrong (1998), Laffont-Rey-Tirole (1998a, 1998b), 
Schiff (2001a, 2001b) and Dessein (2003). 
  The central research question of our study is simple: what are the effects of 
price regulation in retail payments in the light of an applied theoretical model. The 
question is interesting because the Regulation on Cross-border Payments in euro 
was heavily debated when it was launched. The adoption of the Regulation was 
strongly criticised by the payment service provider sector (mainly the banking 
sector) who argued for a market-driven solution.
1 The authorities, in turn, saw the 
Regulation as an ultimate measure to facilitate the lagging development efforts in 
the sector. These real-life controversies provide a fruitful background for our 
theoretical study. For policy analysis purposes, our study also aims at contributing 
to this debate by providing some aspects and theoretical considerations that can be 
taken into account. 
  A further motivation for our study is the scarcity of existing literature 
analysing the retail payment system industry as network industry.
2 To our 
knowledge, there exist very few theoretical studies analysing the pricing of 
payment services based on price competition between the service providers. In 
fact, the study by Weinberg (2002) comes closest to our study. He analysed the 
differences between cooperative and independent setting of interbank prices 
(prices for customer payments between banks in this context) in alternative 
market environments: segmented versus fully-served markets. He concluded that 
cooperation in setting interbank prices typically leads to lower prices and greater 
consumer welfare and profits when markets are segmented. When markets 
become integrated (fully-served), cooperation in setting interbank prices can result 
in higher interbank prices and reduced consumer welfare. 
                                                 
1 However, after the adoption of the Regulation, the banking sector activated and reacted by 
establishing a common decision-making body, the European Payments Council (EPC) to foster the 
development. The EPC has published a White Paper: European Payments Council (2002): 
Euroland: Our Single Payment Area! where measures and steps towards the Single Euro Payments 
Area (SEPA) are presented. Thereafter, the work of the EPC has been intensified and more 
concrete plans have been published, see www.europeanpaymentscouncil.org. 
2 A brief review of literature on network effects in retail payment systems is provided eg in 
Chapter 3.4 in Kemppainen (2003).  
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  In our study, we focus on effects induced by price regulation on retail 
payment systems and base our analysis on the telecommunications competition 
framework of the Laffont-Rey-Tirole (1998a, 1998b).  As stressed above, this is 
justified because many similarities exist between the payment and 
telecommunication industries. Moreover, there are several reasons to utilise the 
Laffont-Rey-Tirole modelling framework. First, the Laffont-Rey-Tirole model has 
become a ‘standard model’ to analyse competition in telecommunications. 
Secondly, in contrast with many other network industry models, the Laffont-Rey-
Tirole model provides an elegant way to introduce network externalities. Thirdly, 
if we give transportation costs a ‘payment technology interpretation’ in the model, 
we can analyse the effects of deepening financial integration by lowering the 
transportation cost leading to integrated and fully-served payment markets where 
national borders do not pose obstacles for payment system competition. 
  The outline of the paper is as follows. Chapter 2 presents the main building 
blocks of the Laffont-Rey-Tirole -based model that is used to analyse the effects 
of price regulation in retail payments. Chapter 3 studies first the pre-regulation 
pricing case (discriminatory pricing) and then the post-regulation case (uniform 
pricing) that prevails when the Regulation is in force. Thereafter the welfare 
changes between the two cases are examined. Chapter 4 concludes and provides a 
discussion on the main policy issues. 
 
 
2 The  model 
The Laffont-Rey-Tirole (1998b) (hereafter LRT) model of telecommunications 
competition and interconnection is applied to analyse effects of price regulation in 
retail payment systems. In the original LRT-model, there are two horizontally 
differentiated networks that supply telecommunication services. The networks 
discriminate in their tariffs according to the destination network: a network offers 
two prices to its subscribers, one for calls made to other subscribers of the same 
network and one for calls to the rival network. 
  In our model, the two networks are interpreted to be retail payment networks 
located in two countries offering price-discriminated domestic and cross-border 
payment services to their customers. As in LRT, we also assume that the retail 
payment networks are differentiated à la Hotelling and consumers are uniformly 
located on the segment [0,1]. The payment networks are located at the two 
extremities of the segments. In contrast to LRT where the markets are assumed to 
be fully covered, we assume that the transportation costs (costs associated with 
access to banking services) are so high that the markets are segmented; ie only  
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partially covered.
3 This is the first change we make to the original LRT-
framework. Secondly, we modify LRT's balanced calling pattern assumption to 
correspond better the payment service world (discussed below) and, we also drop 
out the fixed cost term, f, of serving a customer to reduce complexity in 
calculations. It turns out that these simple modifications change some results LRT 
obtained in their analysis on telecommunication markets. 
  There are two key assumptions made in LRT, (i) reciprocal access charges 
and (ii) balanced calling pattern (balanced payment pattern in our model), that 
deserve some attention in the payment systems context. The reciprocal access 
charge assumption means that a network pays as much for the termination of a 
payment on the foreign network (cross-border payment) as it receives for 
completing a payment originated on the foreign network and resembles thus 
multilateral interchange fees. 
  The balanced payment pattern assumption, in turn, is more problematic and 
would imply that statistically a consumer had an equal chance of making a 
payment to a given consumer belonging to her network and another given 
consumer belonging to the foreign network. Accordingly, the percentage of 
payments originated on a network and completed on the same network (domestic 
payments) would be equal to that network’s market size. In our framework, this 
would imply that the division of domestic and cross-border payments depended 
directly on the sizes (denoted by αi and αj) of payment networks in the two 
countries: ie fraction αi of the payments originated in network i were domestic 
payments and fraction αj cross-border payments. 
  However, this balanced payment pattern assumption is in conflict with the 
real-life situation because domestic retail payments are much more frequently 
made than cross-border payments. In fact, currently cross-border retail payments 
represent roughly 1–2% of all retail payments in the EU. Therefore, in order to 
better reflect the real-life situation, we introduce a sort of ‘home bias’ (denoted by 
a scale factor, S) in making payments. Home bias in making payments simply 
means that the cross-border payments are scaled down by a scale factor S 
(0≤S≤1). The home bias is assumed to be the same in both countries. The 
aggregate payment pattern is then (α1 and α2 representing the sizes of payment 
networks in the two countries). 
 
                                                 
3 The use of segmented market Hotelling model to describe the competitive situation in retail 
payment markets is grounded because, in the international context, the retail payment systems 
located in different countries are not directly competing with each other and are more or less 
acting as local monopolies. Furthermore, when assuming first segmented markets, we can also 
study the effects of technological progress lowering transportation costs: once transportation costs 
are so low that the payments markets are fully-served, we move back to the original LRT-
framework.  
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  Aggregate payment pattern 
  country 1  country 2 
domestic payments  α1α1  α2α2 
cross-border payments  Sα1α2 S α2α1 
 
 
The ‘home-biased’ payment pattern in our model means that a consumer 
belonging to the payment network i has a probability αi to make a domestic 
payment and a probability Sαj to make a cross-border payment. If S=1 (no home 
bias), then the situation is the same as in balanced payment pattern where the 
probabilities for domestic and cross-border payments are α1 and α2, respectively. 
If S=0, then only domestic payments are made. 
 
 
2.1  Cost and price structure 
As in LRT, the two retail payment networks have the same cost structure. A 
network incurs a marginal cost c0 per payment at the originating and terminating 
ends of the payment and marginal cost c1 in between. The total marginal cost of a 
payment is thus 
 
1 0 c c 2 c + =  
 
The total marginal cost of a domestic payment (a payment that is originated and 
terminated in one network) is then c. 
  The cost of a cross-border payment differs from c because payment networks 
pay each other a reciprocal two-way access charge for terminating each other’s 
cross-border payments. The unit access charge to each other’s network is denoted 
by a and is assumed to be same for both networks. Accordingly, the total marginal 
cost of a cross-border payment is c + a – c0. 
  Under price discrimination, pi and  i p ˆ  denote domestic and cross-border prices 
charged by retail payment network i, and αi denote network i’s market size 
defined in terms of network subscribers. In our model, markets are segmented so 
that α1 + α2 < 1 (in LRT-model markets are fully covered: α1 + α2 = 1). 
  The cost and price structure can be summarised as follows: 
 
  Network 1  Network 2 
Domestic payment  price p1, cost c  price p2, cost c 




2.2 Demand  structure 
Following the LRT-model, we assume that the retail payment networks are 
differentiated à la Hotelling. Consumers are uniformly located on the segment 
[0,1] and the networks are located at the two extremities of the segments, x1 = 0 
and x2 = 1. Given income y and payment consumption q, a consumer located at x 
and joining network i has a utility 
 
) q ( u x x t v y i 0 + − − +  
 
where v0 represents a fixed surplus from being connected to a payment network, 
i x x t −  denotes the cost associated with access to banking services (t being the 
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which yields constant elasticity demand function 
 
η − = ⇔ = p q p ) q ( ' u 
 
It is assumed that the elasticity of demand, η, exceeds one and is same for both 
domestic and cross-border payments. It is also assumed that v0 is ‘large enough’ 
so that both networks have positive market sizes even though the transportation 
cost t is also assumed to be so high that the payment networks in the two countries 
are local monopolies (segmented market assumption). 
  Under linear pricing and the possibility of price discrimination, and for 
market sizes (α1, α2), network i offers its customers a variable net surplus 
 
) p ˆ ( v S ) p ( v ) p ˆ , p ( w i j i i i i α + α =  (2.1) 
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According to Equation (2.1), consumer’s variable surplus depends on the prices of 
both domestic and cross-border payments, on the market sizes of the networks as 
well as on the magnitude of home bias, S, in making payments. From equation 
(2.1), it can also be seen that price discrimination creates positive, tariff-mediated 
network externalities. Customers of network i are better off the bigger (smaller) 
the network is if  ) p ˆ p ( p ˆ p i i i i > < . The existence of these network externalities 
can lead to the same kind of coordination problem for consumers, and possibility 
of multiple equilibria, as in models of network externalities where there is no 
interconnection, such as Katz and Shapiro (1985). 
 
 
3  Effects of price regulation 
The Regulation on cross-border payments in euro means that the price 
discrimination is not anymore possible. In our model this indicates that the prices 
of domestic and cross-border payments must be equal,  i i i p p ˆ p = = . We first 
analyse the pre-regulation discriminatory pricing case and then compare it to 
uniform pricing case that prevails under the Regulation. We discuss the welfare 
implications of the regulation at the end of the Chapter. 
 
 
3.1  Discriminatory pricing case 
Market sizes 
 
As mentioned at the end of Chapter 2, the existence of network externalities in our 
model can lead to the possibility of multiple equilibria. Therefore, we assume, as 
eg in Shy (2001), that consumers have a perfect foresight and can thus correctly 
anticipate how many consumers will be subscribing each network. In other words, 
the expected network sizes will correspond to equilibrium network sizes as in 
fulfilled expectations equilibrium used in Katz and Shapiro (1985). Accordingly, 
when assuming  i
e
i α = α , we are able to circumvent multiple equilibria problem 
and get unique market sizes. 
 Let  x1 denote a customer who is indifferent between using network 1’s 
payment services and not using payment services at all. Similarly, let x2 denote a 
customer who is indifferent between using network 2’s payment services and not 
using payment services at all. This means that consumers between 0 and x1 use 
network 1 (located at 0) while those between x2 and 1 use network 2 (located 
at 1). The corresponding market sizes (denoted by α1 = x1 and α2 = 1 – x2) are 
determined by the consumers’ net utilities  
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Network 1  Network 2 
0 t ) p ˆ , p ( w v 1 1 1 0 = α − +  0 t ) p ˆ , p ( w v 2 2 2 0 = α − +  
 
which, when utilising Equation (2.1), become 
 
0 t ) p ˆ ( v S ) p ( v v 1 1 2 1 1 0 = α − α + α +  0 t ) p ˆ ( v S ) p ( v v 2 2 1 2 2 0 = α − α + α +  
) p ( v t





= α  
) p ( v t





= α  
 
 
Accordingly, the market sizes of payment networks can be written as  
 
) p ˆ ( v ) p ˆ ( v S )) p ( v t ))( p ( v t (





1 − − −
− +
= α  
 (3.1) 
) p ˆ ( v ) p ˆ ( v S )) p ( v t ))( p ( v t (





2 − − −
− +
= α  
 





≡  denote the markup on access relative to 
the total cost of a payment. Furthermore, we also assume that, like in LRT, 
‘a proportionality rule’ holds for the relation between domestic and cross-border 
payment prices.
4 The proportionality rule means that the ratio between cross-





i + = . 
  The proportionality rule can be used to reduce price competition to the choice 
of a single price pi per network. Under the proportionality rule, customers’ 
variable net surplus (Equation (2.1)) becomes 
 
) p ( v ) Sk (
) m 1 (
) p ( v




j i i i j i i i
α + α =
+




                                                 
4 In the following, we constrain our analysis to the cases where the proportionality rule holds. The 
validity of the proportionality rule under constrained optimisation is shown in Appendix 1.  
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1 ) m 1 (
1
k − η +
≡  
 
When further utilising the proportionality rule, the market size equations (3.2) can 
be written as 
 
) p ( v ) p ( v k S )) p ( v t ))( p ( v t (





1 − − −
− +
= α  
 (3.3) 
) p ( v ) p ( v k S )) p ( v t ))( p ( v t (





2 − − −
− +
= α  
 
Finally, when we denote the index of access to banking services as the inverse of 
the transportation cost, σ = 1/t, the market sizes become 
 
[]
) k S 1 )( p ( v ) p ( v )) p ( v ) p ( v ( 1






1 − σ + + σ −
− σ − σ
= α  
 (3.4) 
[]
) k S 1 )( p ( v ) p ( v )) p ( v ) p ( v ( 1






2 − σ + + σ −
− σ − σ
= α  
 
Differentiating (3.4) we can see that the effect of network 1’s price on market size 
is (similarly for network 2’s price) 
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Remark 1. The effect of network i’s price on market size goes in the same 
direction for both networks. This is in contrast with LRT results and is due to our 
segmented markets assumption. 
 
In the pre-regulation discriminatory pricing case, the profit function of network i 
can be written as 
 
[ ]
revenue access payments border cross domestic
) p ˆ ( mcq S ) p ˆ ( q )) m 1 ( c p ˆ ( S ) p ( q ) c p ( j j i i i j i i i i i
−




Accordingly, payment network i’s profit is composed of revenue from domestic 
and cross-border payments as well as access revenue (assuming that m>0) it 
receives for terminating other network’s cross-border payments. 
  Under the proportionality rule, the profit function for network 1 (similarly for 
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  The first order condition for profit maximisation for network 1 is (similarly 
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Under symmetry, α1 = α2 = α, p1 = p2  =  p, and from the proportionality rule 
p ) m 1 ( p ˆ p ˆ p ˆ 2 1 + = = = , and denoting v  =  v(p), the first-order condition can be 
written as 
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The first-order condition equation (3.7) is complicated but it implicitly gives the 





3.2  Uniform pricing case 
The Regulation means that both domestic and cross-border retail payments must 
be priced equally. In our model this means that  i i i p p ˆ p = = , ie only one uniform 
price is charged for both type of payments. In the following, we refer this case as 





The procedure to define market sizes follows similar steps as in the case of price 
discrimination. Accordingly, under perfect foresight assumption  i
e
i α = α , market 
sizes are determined by the consumers’ net utility expressions 
 
Network 1  Network 2 
0 t ) p ( v S ) p ( v v 1 1 2 1 1 0 = α − α + α +   0 t ) p ( v S ) p ( v v 2 2 1 2 2 0 = α − α + α +  
) p ( v t





= α  
) p ( v t





= α  
 
and we can solve the market sizes to be 
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In the post-regulation uniform pricing case, the effects of network 1’s price on 
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Remark 2. The effect of network i’s price on market sizes goes in the same 
direction for both networks. This is in contrast with LRT results and is due to our 
segmented market assumption. 
 
In the uniform pricing case, the expression for network i’s profits is 
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3.3  Welfare effects of price regulation 
In this section, effects of price regulation are examined by comparing the 
discriminatory and uniform pricing cases. Fixing the reciprocal access charge a, 
effects of price regulation are now studied in the case when the index of access to 
banking services, σ = 0. The results hold by continuity for small σ. It should be 
noted that low σ corresponds to large transportation cost t, and the case σ = 0 
would in fact mean infinite transportation costs. Therefore, as in LRT, we have to 
assume that fixed surplus of being connected to a payment network, v0, increases 
as σ tends to zero so that the equilibrium market size of payment networks remain 
unchanged. In fact, the ‘case σ = 0’ is defined by taking the limit as σ → 0 and v0 
increasing. 
 We  define  pu, pd and  d p ˆ  to denote the equilibrium prices under uniform 
pricing and under discriminatory pricing for domestic and cross-border retail 









































Accordingly, the uniform price will be a weighted average of discriminatory 
prices 
 










=  (3.12) 
 
where the degree of home-bias in making payments, S, is the weight. Clearly, 
when there is an extreme home-bias (S=0) the post-regulation uniform price is 
exactly the pre-regulation domestic price. Respectively, when there is no home 
bias in making payments, ie S=1, the uniform price will be the average of the pre-





When looking at the global welfare by summing up the consumer and producer 
surpluses (for complete calculations, see Appendix 2), we get the following 
expressions for global welfare for the case of very high access cost to banking 
services (σ = 0). 
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For simplicity, the transportation cost terms (
2
i tα ’s) are first dropped out and we 
concentrate on the gross welfare comparisons 
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 (3.15) 
 
Accordingly, we can establish the following inequality (stating that gross welfare 
is higher under discriminatory pricing) and examine whether it holds 
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The validity of the equation (3.17) is checked in two steps 
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d α α ): 
In symmetry, the equilibrium market sizes under discriminatory pricing αd 
(Equation (3.4)) and uniform pricing αu (Equation (3.9)) can be written as 
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  >1 when m>0 (positive access charge, k<1) 
  =1 when m=0 (zero access charge, k=1) 
  < 1 when m<0 (negative access charge, k>1), not relevant case here 
 
(ii) Secondly, examining the term:  ) p ˆ ( W
S 1
S
) p ( W
S 1
1




By Jensen’s inequality it strictly holds when m>0 and S>0 because the gross 
welfare function 
η − − η − −
− η
η
= − = cp p
1
) p ( cq )) p ( q ( u ) p ( W
) 1 (  reaches a maximum 
at p  =  c and is convex for p greater than 
M p / c ) 1 ( < η + η . Because all prices 
weakly exceed the monopoly price, a mean-preserving price spread raises gross 
welfare. 
  When combining (i) and (ii), we get 
 






u α + α < + α  
 
In other words, for high access cost to banking services (high transportation costs) 
and for positive markup on access (m>0) and no extreme home bias (S>0), gross 
social welfare is higher under price discrimination than under uniform pricing 
prevailing under price regulation. The reason for this is that price discrimination 
alleviates the double-marginalisation effect that arises when the access charge 
exceeds marginal cost. Price discrimination decreases the double markup for 
domestic payments and raises it for cross-border payments. This price dispersion 
benefits customers whose net surplus function is convex. Similarly as in LRT, in 
the second-best context in which prices are already distorted by a double-
marginalisation, the distortion due to price discrimination may actually be 
beneficial.  
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  The above results are reversed if we look at the total welfare comparison and 
include the transportation cost terms (
2
i tα ’s) as well 
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In this case the transportation cost terms would be dominating the welfare 
comparison because  u d α > α  for positive access charges (m>0). However, the 
meaningfulness of the analysis is in this case questionable because we are looking 
at the case in which  0 → σ  (ie transportation cost t approaches infinity) and v0 
increases simultaneously so that payment market sizes in each country remain 
unchanged. 
  By continuity, we can argue, as in LRT, that the above results hold for small 
σ. However, the analysis of the general case σ > 0, based on the equations (3.7) 
and (3.11), is difficult and would require simulations or modifications to 
modelling framework. 
  In conclusion, the above analysis showed that the welfare effects of price 
regulation in retail payment systems are difficult to be comprehensively 
evaluated. We were able to draw analytical results only in a special case. 
However, according to Laffont-Rey-Tirole, it is well known that welfare effects of 
price discrimination are ambiguous, both in monopolistic and competitive 
environments (see eg Lederer and Hurter (1986), Thisse and Vives (1988), 
Holmes (1989), Armstrong and Vickers (2001)). Therefore, it is not very 
surprising that that our model, at least in its present form, was not capable of 
producing clear-cut analytical welfare results. In order to quantify the possible 
welfare effects of price regulation in retail payments, simulations of the present 
model could be employed. 
 
 
4  Discussion on policy implications 
For potential policy implications, the findings of our theoretical model must be 
assessed against the real-life phenomena. It is no doubt that the Regulation 
adopted by the European Parliament and the EU Commission on cross-border 
retail payments in euro has proved to be a strong regulatory measure to foster the 
integration process in the European retail payment markets. In essence, the 
Regulation has eliminated the price discrepancy between comparable domestic 
and cross-border retail payments provided that certain conditions for the payment  
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are fulfilled
5. From purely integration policy perspective, the Regulation has 
expanded the Single market concept also to the retail payments area at least in the 
Euro area. According to the European Commission (2003), the Regulation has 
contributed to a considerable reduction in the price of cross-border payments in 
the Internal Market. Even more importantly, it has also provided an incentive for 
the payment industry to cooperate and modernise their EU-wide retail payment 
infrastructures. In general, the Commission sees the Regulation as an important 
step in the process of achieving a Single Payment Area for non-cash payments in 
the Internal Market. 
  Naturally, the real quantitative effects induced by the Regulation can be 
assessed only over time when long enough time series have been gathered eg by 
the means of comprehensive pricing surveys. The Commission has been 
conducting such studies even earlier on and has recently contracted out two 
studies.
6 In general, the results suggest that prices of cross-border payments have 
reduced and that there have not been considerable increases in the domestic 
payment prices. However, there is also a potential caveat to reliably assess the 
effects of the Regulation because it may prove to be cumbersome to detect ‘the 
pure regulation effects’ on retail payment prices because other factors like 
different pricing conventions (eg bundling of banking services) and technological 
developments (eg internet banking) have also influence on price developments 
over time. 
  When viewing the Regulation from the theoretical perspective, the following 
observations are worth stressing. As a regulatory measure, the Regulation is 
strong and somewhat peculiar since it regulates directly the final retail prices. In 
many other network industries (like eg telecommunications, electricity etc.), the 
focus of regulation has been on the intermediate prices (access prices). In fact, it 
has been stressed (see eg Mason and Valletti (2001)) that access pricing and its 
regulation are very important in the network industries where the interconnection 
conditions among networks are crucial. In order to solve the potential 
interconnection disputes, different types of rules have been put forward in many 
network industries: Long-Run Incremental Cost (LRIC), Cost-based rules, 
                                                 
5 A cross-border retail payment is subject to the Regulation and must be priced in a similar way as 
a comparable domestic payment, when the payment information provided by the payment 
originator fulfils criteria stipulated in the Regulation. For example, in cross-border credit transfers, 
the IBAN (the International Bank Account Number) and BIC (the Bank Identifier Code) must be 
employed. Therefore, in order to fully benefit from the Regulation, customers should consistently 
use these international retail payment standards, because otherwise the payment service providers 
are not obliged to price equally the comparable domestic and cross-border payments. For more 
practical information, see eg the web pages of the European Committee for Banking Standards 
(www.ecbs.org), the European Central Bank (www.ecb.int), the Commission 
(www.europa.eu.int); or for the Finnish case, the Finnish Bankers’ Association 
(www.pankkiyhdistys.fi) 
6 For recent assessments of the impact of the Regulation, see Retail Banking Research (2005a, b) 
published in the European Commission’s website.  
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Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), and Ramsey Charges and Global 
Caps. All these rules are used to determine the optimal access prices but, on the 
other hand, they also require the regulators to have an extensive and 
comprehensive knowledge of the cost structure of the industry in order for them to 
implement the rules properly. Accordingly, applicability of these rules to payment 
service industry may prove to be difficult because the real cost structure is 
‘private information’ of the payment service providers. Therefore, these access 
pricing rules – at least as such – are difficult to implement in the payment service 
industry. 
  Even though the welfare effects of price regulation were difficult to quantify 
in our theoretical framework, we are able to draw some theoretically-based 
predictions from our model and compare them with real-life observations. Firstly, 
we are able to say something on the reactions of the retail payment prices when 
looking at the optimal pricing decisions suggested by our model. In the simplified 
case analysed at the end of the Chapter 3, our model indicated that the uniform 
price under the regulation would be a weighted average of discriminatory prices in 
the segmented retail payment markets. In real-life, conducted price studies suggest 
that the post-regulation cross-border prices have indeed converged towards pre-
regulation domestic payment price levels. In fact, when letting the home-bias 
factor S in making payments (Equation (3.12)) to be small ie [0.01, 0.02] because 
currently 1–2% of all retail payments are cross-border payments in the EU, the 
uniform price predicted by our model would be very close to pre-regulation 
domestic payment price which then seems to be in line with the real life 
developments. In our model, the driving force for this result is the assumed home-
bias in making payments (S very small). However, it should be noted that without 
any home-bias (S=1), the optimal uniform price suggested by our model would be 
the arithmetic average of pre-regulation domestic and cross-border prices. 
  This real-life convergence of prices towards pre-regulation domestic price 
level is not surprising even when looking at the price-setting behaviour from 
purely economic and business policy perspectives: the cross-border payments are 
more expensive to produce because the proper infrastructure has been lacking, but 
at the same time they represent such a minor fraction of the total retail payments 
that the payment service providers can possibly treat them as loss-leaders and 
cross-subsidise them using revenues from other banking services. This situation 
may change in the future as the deepening financial integration and increasing 
cross-border trade is likely to bring about also the increasing need for cross-border 
retail payments and thereby reduce the present home-bias in making payments. 
Were the infrastructures for cross-border payments not to be improved 
accordingly, the cost-cutting pressures for payment service providers would 
increase considerably. However, at least in the credit transfer area, the activation 
by the service provider sector seems to result in the improved infrastructure. For 
example, the launch of the Euro Banking Association’s STEP  2 -system for  
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processing cross-border bulk retail payments is likely to mitigate this problem by 
providing a Pan-European Automated Clearing House (PEACH) for cross-border 
payments. While a PEACH, if successfully and widely enough adopted, clearly 
facilitates the utilisation of the inherent economies of scale in retail payment 
service provision, a potential ‘access problem’ can emerge: if only the biggest 
players in the field are directly participating in the system and medium and 
smaller players act as indirect participants and buy their retail payments services 
from the bigger players. This may re-introduce the access pricing problem also in 
the retail payments area, and in this respect, guidance from regulatory principles 
used in the traditional network industries can then prove to be useful. 
  Secondly, in our segmented market model general welfare implications of 
price regulation on retail payment prices were found to be ambiguous. Due the 
complexity of the optimal pricing equations, we had to limit our welfare analysis 
to the special case where costs of access to banking services (transportation costs) 
were assumed be high. In this case, the gross social welfare excluding 
transportation costs was found to be higher under pre-regulation discriminatory 
pricing than under post-regulation uniform pricing. However, when transportation 
costs were also taken into account, the results were exactly the opposite. 
Accordingly, based on our model set-up, strong policy stance on the desirability 
of regulation cannot be taken. 
  Thirdly, a further implication we are able to draw from our theoretical model 
deals with the transportation costs (in our model interpreted as costs associated 
with access to banking services) and the related segmentation of the payment 
service market. When assuming that access costs to banking services would be 
declining as a result of deepening economic and financial integration and 
technological progress in providing banking services, the current segmentation of 
the retail payment markets is very likely to be reduced. At the end of such a 
development, our theoretical model set-up would be similar to the original 
Laffont-Rey-Tirole model where the markets are fully-served and service 
providers compete directly with each other. Accordingly, in such a situation we 
can then directly apply and re-interpret their results.  In general, the LRT-results 
suggest that allowing price discrimination is more beneficial for social welfare 
than imposing uniform pricing by regulation. However, it should be noted that 
also their welfare results were obtained in a similar simplified case (high 
transportation costs) as ours, and therefore, their generalisation should be done in 
a cautious way. Anyway, the LRT-results suggest that, when markets are fully 
served, regulation of prices by imposing a uniform price is welfare reducing. 
  Concerning the real-life, comprehensive analysis of welfare effects induced 
by the price regulation on retail payment services is even more difficult because 
of numerous interlinkages in banking and payment operations (eg bundling of 
different banking services using ‘package’ pricing). Our theoretical modelling 
already ended up with ambiguities and real-life analysis is even more likely to do  
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so. However, a clear merit of the Regulation is the fact that, after its adoption, the 
payment service provider sector has been forced to act to improve infrastructure. 
The establishment of the European Payments Council as a common decision-
making body and the set-up of the STEP  2 -payment system as a potential 
candidate for a Pan-European Automated Clearing House are nice examples of 
this ‘regulation-induced’ activation of the service providers. Naturally, only the 
coming years will tell how successful – in terms of welfare improvements for EU 
citizens – the Regulation on cross-border payments in euro finally was. 
  All in all, it can be concluded that, given the controversies in the price 
regulation question and the scarcity of studies on the pricing of retail payment 
services in general, future research on the topic is warranted. In this context, the 
rather extensive literature on the interconnection pricing in the 
telecommunications industry could serve as a good background. One direct 
possibility would be to modify and simplify the framework of the model presented 
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The proportionality rule means that the ratio between cross-border and domestic 








1 + = = . Under 
constrained optimisation, the validity of the proportionality rule can be checked in 
a similar way as in LRT. 
 
Proof 
The proportionality rule is obtained by considering network i’s optimal price 
structure when keeping its market size constant. To keep its market size constant, 
network i must offer a constant average net surplus to its customers. In the 
discriminatory pricing case, the program can be written as 
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where tildes indicate that the variable is kept constant. 
  The problem can be solved by using the following Lagrangean expression 
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The first-order conditions are 
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Assuming that the two payment services have the same elasticity, η, and utilising 
q = p
-η and 




























A2.1 Discriminatory  pricing 
Producer surplus (PS) 
 
[] [ ] ) p ˆ ( q ) c p ˆ ( S ) p ( q ) c p ( ) p ˆ ( q ) c p ˆ ( S ) p ( q ) c p ( 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 − α + − α α + − α + − α α  
 
which becomes under symmetry ( d 2 1 p p p = = ,  d 2 1 p ˆ p ˆ p ˆ = = ,  d 2 1 α = α = α ) 
 
[ ] [ ]
() ()
η − − η − η − − η −
η − η − η − η −
− α + − α =










d d d d d d d d d d d d d
p ˆ c p ˆ 2 cp p 2








( t ) p ˆ ( v S ) p ( v )
2
( t ) p ˆ ( v S ) p ( v
2
2
2 1 2 2 2
2
1
1 2 1 1 1
α
− α + α α +
α
− α + α α  
 



















d d d d d
2
d








t ) p ˆ ( v S 2 ) p ( v 2
)
2
( t ) p ˆ ( v S ) p ( v )
2






α − α + α =
α
− α + α α +
α
− α + α α

































α + − α + − α =
− η − − η −
η − − η − η − − η −  
. t ) p ˆ ( W S 2 ) p ( W 2
t p ˆ c p ˆ
1



















α − α + α =
























A2.2 Uniform  pricing 
Producer surplus (PS) 
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